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I. SUMMARY OF THIS RESPONSE 
This Supreme Court proceeding is the appellate review of a 
February 2010 Final Judgment.  That judgment declared the State’s prior 
funding formulas violated Article IX, section 1 of our State constitution.  
It was based on a 2009 trial with 55 witnesses and 566 exhibits.1   
The State now asks this Court to do two things: 
One- terminate this appellate review of the 2010 Final Judgment 
declaring the State’s prior funding formulas 
unconstitutional,2 and  
Two- make a factual finding declaring the State’s new funding 
formulas fully comply with Article IX, section 1.3   
This is plaintiffs’ response.  
  
                                                 
1 RP 1-5659 and CP 2866-2971 (all witnesses & exhibits listed at CP 2946-2971). 
2 E.g., State Of Washington’s Memorandum Transmitting The Legislature’s 2018 
Post-Budget Report (“State’s 2018 Brief”) at 2 (“The Court should...terminate review”), 
at 6 (“The Court should...terminate review”), at 3 (Issue #3: “Should the court 
relinquish its retained jurisdiction and terminate review?”), at 17 (“The Court should 
relinquish jurisdiction over this appeal and terminate review”), & at 18 (“the Court 
should relinquish its retained jurisdiction and terminate review”).     
3 See, e.g., State’s 2018 Brief at 2 (“the Court should hold the State has achieved full 
compliance with article IX, section 1 of the Washington constitution and with the Court’s 
2012 McCleary decision”), at 2 (Issue #1: “Is the State now in full compliance with 
article IX, section 1 of the Washington constitution?”), at 6 (“The Court should find that 
the State is in full compliance with article IX, section 1 and the 2012 McCleary 
decision”), at 8 (the November 2017 Order held the State is fully funding its new 
formulas for transportation, etc.), at 16 (“The State is now in full compliance with 
article IX, section 1 and this Court’s 2012 decision”), & at 17 (“The Court should hold 
that the State has achieved full compliance with article IX, section 1 of the Washington 
constitution and with the Court’s 2012 McCleary decision”).   
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One (the past).  At this point:  
 The 2010 Final Judgment’s legal rulings on the meaning of 
Article IX, section 1 have been affirmed. 
 The 2010 Final Judgment’s factual determination that the 
State’s prior funding formulas violated Article IX, section 1 has 
been affirmed.   
 The 2018 legislature passed legislation addressing this Court’s 
remedial order (i.e., fund the State’s new formulas by 
September 1, 2018). 
 The 2018 legislature passed legislation addressing this Court’s 
daily sanctions order (i.e., $100,000 immediately payable every 
day beginning on August 13, 2015). 
As for what is now in the past, the Final Judgment’s legal and 
factual rulings have been affirmed and put to bed.  And the State has now 
enacted legislation addressing this Court’s remedial and sanctions orders.  
Plaintiffs accordingly recognize that continuing this appellate review from 
the underlying 2010 Final Judgment is no longer absolutely necessary.  
They recognize that termination of this appellate review will allow the 
State’s new funding formulas to operate this upcoming school year 
without post-budget filings in this Court next year.  Indeed, that’s 
consistent with this Court’s November 2017 Order, which noted the 
State’s new program can operate with school district experience being the 
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judge of whether the State’s new program funding proves adequate to 
comply with the ample funding mandate of Article IX, section 1.4  
Two (the future).  At this point:  
 The State will be funding its new formulas by September 1, 
2018.  
 The State alleges its new formulas amply fund all ten 
components of the State’s basic education program.  
 Plaintiffs assert the new formulas do not provide ample funding. 
 But the evidentiary record in this case contains no sworn 
testimony or trial court evidence addressing whether the new 
formulas do or do not amply fund all ten components of the 
State’s basic education program.  
As for the future, the State’s new formulas do increase State 
funding.  But since those new formulas did not exist during this suit’s trial, 
this suit’s appellate record does not have trial evidence proving whether or 
not that increase is constitutionally adequate to comply with the ample 
funding mandate of Article IX, section 1.   
The appellate record in this case accordingly provides no 
evidentiary basis for this Court to rule at this point that the State’s new 
funding formulas do in fact amply fund the State’s basic education 
program in full compliance with Article IX, section 1.  Indeed, such a 
declaration would be inconsistent with this Court’s November 2017 Order, 
                                                 
4 November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to 
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves 
adequate.”). 
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which held that school district experience (rather than this McCleary 
proceeding) will be the judge of whether the State’s new funding formulas 
do in fact amply fund the State’s basic education program in full 
compliance with Article IX, section 1.5 
 
II. ADDRESSING THE PAST: 
                         THE STATE’S PRIOR FUNDING FORMULAS 
A. Further Review Is Not Needed To Confirm The Trial Court’s 
Legal Rulings   (the meaning of Article IX, section 1) 
This Court’s January 2012 decision unanimously affirmed the legal 
rulings in the February 2010 Final Judgment.6  It unequivocally cemented 
the legal meaning of Article IX, section 1: 
 “Article IX, section 1 confers on children in Washington a 
positive constitutional right to an amply funded education.”7   
 This right to an amply funded education is each Washington 
child’s paramount right under our State Constitution.8   
                                                 
5 November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to 
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves 
adequate.”). 
6 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 514-529 (majority, per Stephens, J.) and at 547 
(concurrence/dissent per Madsen, C.J.) (“I agree with Justice Stephens’ articulation of 
the State’s duty to fund education under article IX, section 1 of the Washington 
Constitution”).    
7 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 483 (underline added); accord, August 2015 McCleary 
Order at 2 (“In McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520, we held that the State’s ‘paramount duty’ 
under article IX, section 1...not only obligates the State to act in amply providing for 
public education, it also confers upon the children of the state the right to be amply 
provided with an education. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 513”) (underline 
added); McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2903, ¶148 (quoting that Seattle School District 
ruling).   
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 Unlike rights framed in the negative to restrict government 
action, this is a positive constitutional right that requires 
government action.9  
 “all children” means every Washington child has this right:  
“each and every child”; “No child is excluded.”10   
 “paramount duty” means “the State must amply provide for 
the education of all Washington children as the State’s first 
and highest priority before any other State programs or 
operations.”11   
                                                 
 
8 Seattle School District, 90 Wn.2d at 510-513; McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 514-522; 
McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2903, ¶¶147-149. 
9 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 518-519.   
10 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520 (underlines added); 2010 McCleary Final Judgment at 
CP 2908, ¶168 (“the word ‘all’ in Article IX, §1 means what it says.... It encompasses 
each and every child since each will be a member of, and participant in, this State’s 
democracy, society, and economy.  Article IX, §1 accordingly requires the Respondent 
State to amply provide for the education of every child residing in our State – not just 
those children who enjoy the advantage of being born into one of the subsets of our 
State’s children who are more privileged, more politically popular, or more easy to 
teach.”); more background at Plaintiffs’ September 2010 Brief With Errata at 32-35. 
11 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520 (underline added); August 2015 McCleary Order at 2 
(“In McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 520, we held that the State’s ‘paramount duty’ under 
article IX, section 1 is of first and highest priority, requiring fulfillment before any other 
State program or operation”); 2010 McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2906, ¶159 
(“ ‘Paramount’ is not a mere synonym of ‘important.’ Rather, it means superior in rank 
above all others, chief, preeminent, supreme, and in fact dominant.... When a thing is said 
to be paramount, it can only mean that it is more important than all other things 
concerned.”) (quoting Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wn.2d at 511) (underlines 
added); McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2906, ¶160 (reiterating this constitutional 
mandate’s application: “During the trial, the State cross-examined many of the 
Petitioners’ education witnesses as to whether they would prioritize education at the 
expense of other worthy causes and services, such as health care, nutrition services, and 
transportation needs. But this is not the prerogative of these witnesses – or even of the 
Legislature – that decision has been mandated by our State Constitution.”); see also, 
sworn trial testimony of the Director of the State’s Office of Financial Management 
(OFM) at RP 3561:2-15 (testifying that K-12 funding must come first before State 
programs for other matters such as public safety, human services, and health care).   
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 “ample” funding means “considerably more than just 
adequate or merely sufficient.”12     
In short:  this Court has already affirmed the legal meaning of Article IX, 
section 1.  Further review is not needed to affirm it again.13  
                                                 
12 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 528 (“ample” in Article IX, section 1 means “considerably 
more than just adequate or merely sufficient”) & 484 (“ample” in Article IX, section 1 
means “fully sufficient, and considerably more than just adequate”); McCleary Final 
Judgment at CP 2907, ¶¶162-164 (quoting same dictionary this Court used in its 1978 
Seattle School District decision (“AMPLE always means considerably more than 
adequate or sufficient”), and reiterating that “Consistent with this meaning, the 
Washington Supreme Court has held that Article IX, §1 requires the Respondent State to 
provide ‘fully sufficient funds’ and a ‘level of funding that is fully sufficient’ to provide 
for the education of all Washington children.  Seattle School District v.  State, 90 Wn.2d 
at 518, 537.”).   
13 Although the State asserts in a footnote that this Court “rejected plaintiffs’ attempt 
to import capital costs into article IX, section 1” [State’s 2018 Brief at 8 n.2], plaintiffs 
never claimed the 2010 Final Judgment on appeal in this proceeding held that full or sole 
State funding of all capital costs is required by Article IX, section 1, or that the State’s 
prototypical school allocation model for operating costs incorporated capital 
construction costs too.  Instead, (1) plaintiffs accurately noted this Court had cautioned 
the State to account for how districts could secure the capital funds needed to achieve the 
full-day kindergarten and K-3 class sizes set by the State, and (2) the State then assured 
this Court that the State had done so.   
As to the first point, see, e.g., January 2014 McCleary Order at 5 (noting OSPI’s 
estimate that school districts will need about $704 million to build the classrooms 
required to expand kindergarten to full-day and reduce K-3 class sizes to 17, and holding 
“the State must account for the actual cost to schools of providing these components of 
basic education”) and at 7 (reiterating that State funding at that time did “not account 
for the additional capital investment needed to implement full-day kindergarten”); 
August 2015 McCleary Order at 3 (noting “the need for adequate capital expenditures to 
ensure implementation of all-day kindergarten and early elementary class size 
reductions”) and at 6 (“as to both class size reductions and all-day kindergarten, it is 
unclear, and the State does not expressly say, whether the general budget or the capital 
budget makes sufficient capital outlays to ensure that classrooms will be available for full 
implementation of all-day kindergarten and reduced class sizes....  The State has 
provided no plan for how it intends to pay for the facilities needed for all-day 
kindergarten and reduced class sizes. As the court emphasized in its January 2014 order, 
the State needs to account for the actual cost to schools of providing all-day kindergarten 
and smaller K-3 class sizes.”); October 2016 McCleary Order at 2-3 (noting “the need 
for adequate capital expenditures to ensure implementation of all-day kindergarten and 
early elementary class size reductions.”)   
As to the second point, see the State’s oral argument before this Court’s 
November 2017 Order, telling this Court how the State was providing large amounts of 
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B. Further Review Is Not Needed To Confirm The Trial Court’s 
Factual Findings   (the State’s prior  funding formulas violated 
Article IX, section 1) 
This Court’s January 2012 decision unanimously affirmed the 
factual declarations in the February 2010 Final Judgment. 14  For example, 
under the State’s prior funding formulas:  
 “State funding is not ample”.15    
 The State “is not amply providing for the equipping of all 
children residing in this State with the basic knowledge and 
skills included within the substantive ‘education’ mandated by 
Article IX, §1.”16   
 “The State’s provisions for education do not provide all children 
residing in our State with a realistic or effective opportunity to 
become equipped with that knowledge, skill, or substantive 
‘education’”.17     
As this Court therefore succinctly declared when affirming the 2010 Final 
Judgment in this appeal: “The State has failed to meet its duty under 
article IX, section 1 by consistently providing school districts with a level 
                                                 
 
school construction funding, and saying the State was not aware of any full-day 
kindergarten or K-3 class size reductions being prevented by lack of classroom space.  
[available at https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2017101066 , timestamp 18:55-20:50.]   
14 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 529-530 (majority, per Stephens, J.) and at 547 
(concurrence/dissent per Madsen, C.J.) (“I agree with ... the conclusion that the current 
system is not operating at its constitutionally mandated levels”).    
15 McCleary Final Judgment at ¶IV Conclusion (CP 2945). 
16 McCleary Final Judgment at ¶231 (CP 2929) (“The Respondent State is not amply 
providing for the equipping of all children residing in this State with the basic knowledge 
and skills mandated by this State's minimum education standards. The Respondent State 
is not amply providing for the equipping of all children residing in this State with the 
basic knowledge and skills included within the substantive ‘education’ mandated by 
Article IX, §1”). 
17 McCleary Final Judgment at ¶231(a) (CP 2929). 
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of resources that falls short of the actual costs of the basic education 
program.”18   
In short:  this Court has already affirmed the trial court’s factual 
findings and determination that the State’s funding formulas at the time of 
trial violated Article IX, section 1.  Further review is not needed to affirm 
the Final Judgment’s factual findings about the State’s prior funding.  
 
C. Further Review Is Not Needed To Implement This Court’s 
Remedial Orders   (fully fund all the State’s new formulas by 
September 1, 2018) 
This Court’s remedial orders required the State to fully fund all the 
new formulas the State said it was working on by no later than 
September 1, 2018.19  This Court’s recent November 2017 Order noted the 
                                                 
18 McCleary, 173 Wn2d at 547. 
19 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at  484 (noting Court was deferring to “the State’s plan to 
fully implement the reforms by 2018”) & 508 (reiterating Court’s 2018 deadline was 
based on fact “the legislature declared its intent to implement the details of ESHB 2261 
through a phased-in approach as recommended by the QEC, with full implementation by 
2018. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 548, §114(5)(b)(iii).”);  December 2012 McCleary Order at 2 
(2018 is a “firm deadline for full constitutional compliance”) (underlines added); 
October 2016 McCleary Order at 12-13 (“Any program for full state funding of basic 
education must therefore be fully implemented not later than September 1, 2018. ...[T]he 
legislature committed itself to enacting a fully complying program by the end of the 2017 
session. This court has never purported to alter the compliance deadline. We conclude, 
based on the relevant legislation, that the State has until September 1, 2018, to fully 
implement its program of basic education, and that the remaining details of that 
program, including funding sources and the necessary appropriations for the 2017-19 
biennium, are to be in place by final adjournment of the 2017 legislative session.”). 
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State met this deadline with one exception:  the State fell about $1 billion 
short in funding its new salary formula by September 1, 2018.20 
The State says its 2018 legislature provided that missing salary 
funding through two enactments adding $969.8 million by the 
September 1, 2018 start of 2018-2019 school year.21  
Plaintiffs want to be clear: they do not believe the State’s new 
funding formulas provide ample State funding for the education of all 
Washington children as Article IX, section 1 requires.   
But the State has now at least provided for the funding of its new 
formulas by the September 1, 2018 deadline set by this Court’s remedial 
orders.  Plaintiffs accordingly recognize that continuing this proceeding’s 
appellate review is no longer needed to ensure the State funds its new 
formulas by the remedial orders’ September 1, 2018 deadline.22   
                                                 
20 November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 41 (concluding: “by all relevant estimates, it 
appears EHB 2242 and the 2017-19 budget fall short by about a billion dollars in fully 
funding the salary increases by the 2018-19 school year”) & 2 (“Until the State enacts 
measures that fully implement its program of basic education by the September 1, 2018 
deadline, it remains out of compliance”). 
21 State’s 2018 Brief at 9-11 (asserting that  ESSB 6030 [supplemental operating 
budget] added $775.8 million in the 2018-2019 fiscal year for the first ten months of the 
2018-2019 school year, and E2SSB 6362 (McCleary bill) committed the State to adding 
$194.0 million in the 2019-2020 fiscal year for the last two months of the 2018-2019 
school year); accord Legislature’s 2018 Report at 12-13.  Plaintiffs will trust that the 
State’s representation to this Court that it will appropriate that $194 million is true. 
22 Supra, footnote 21.     
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D. Further Review Is Not Needed To Determine The Monetary 
Sanction Amount Still Owed On July 1, 2018    
($18,209,687.67) 
This Court’s sanctions order imposed a liquidated $100,000 legal 
obligation on the State every single day starting on August 13, 2015.23  
Since there are 1052 days from that date to the July 1, 2018 date the 
supplemental budget takes effect, and since 1052 times $100,000 equals 
$105.2 million, the State says it will fully pay the accrued sanction when 
its supplemental budget places $105.2 million in a Dedicated McCleary 
Penalty Account.24      
But each day’s $100,000 sanction was a liquidated obligation 
“effective immediately” and “payable daily”.25  Thus, as previous briefing 
has noted – and the State has never disputed – each day’s $100,000 
obligation accrued prejudgment interest at the statutory 12% rate until 
                                                 
23 The August 13, 2015 sanctions order imposed a daily penalty in the liquidated sum 
of $100,000 per day “effective immediately”, and “payable daily to be held in a 
segregated account”.  August 13, 2015 McCleary Order at 9-10; October 6, 2016 
McCleary Order at 13 (the payable-daily penalty shall continue to accrue); and as 
background, September 11, 2014 McCleary Order (ruling the State in contempt of court). 
24 See, e.g., Legislature’s 2018 Report at 23 (the $105.2 million placed in the 
Dedicated McCleary Penalty Account “represents the accrued penalty from August 13, 
2015...through June 30, 2018”);  State’s 2018 Brief at 1-2 (the funds deposited into that 
account fully pay the sanction accruing from August 13, 2015 through June 30, 2018), 
at 2 (“the Court should find that the State has...paid the sanction”);  at 2 (Issue #2: did 
the 2018 legislature deposit into the penalty account “funds sufficient to pay the accrued 
contempt sanction”), at 6 (the Court should find that “the 2018 legislature [did]...fully 
pay the contempt sanction that has accrued since August 2015”), at 14 (asserting the 
2018 legislature fully paid the contempt sanction accrued from August 13, 2015 through 
June 30, 2018 with $105.2 million), at 15 (“The Court should...find that the State has 
fully paid the sanction”), & at 17 (“The Court should find that the State has fully paid the 
accrued contempt sanction”).    
25  Supra, footnote 23.     
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paid.26  Running a basic summation equation for that accruing interest 
over the 1052 days of $100,000 sanctions yields an accrued interest total 
of $18,209,687.67.27    
This $18 million shortfall might seem akin to a “rounding error” to 
government officials in charge of an over $40 billion biennium State 
budget.  But $18 million is not trivial to a struggling middle school student 
excluded from the State’s most recent LAP funding increase because his 
school has “only” a 49% poverty rate.  Or a non-English speaking 
elementary school student excluded from the State’s most recent TBIP 
funding increase because she hasn’t made it to high school yet.  Or a 
troubled high school student left without timely counseling under the 
State’s partial-FTE funding of school mental health counselors.  Or a 
disabled student in a school district whose disabled student population 
exceeds the 13.5% cap on the State’s special education funding. 
In short:  the supplemental budget that commences on July 1, 2018 
fails to fund $18,209,687.67 of the monetary sanction accrued through 
                                                 
26 Plaintiffs’ 2016 Post-Budget Filing at 29 & 45.  Accord, e.g., Rekhter v. Washington 
Department of Social & Health Services [“DSHS”], 180 Wn.2d 102, 124, 323 P.3d 1036 
(2014) (“Prejudgment interest is available...when an amount claimed is ‘liquidated’ ”);  
Pierce County v. State, 144 Wn.App. 783, 855, 185 P.3d 594 (2008) (trial court abused 
its discretion by denying prejudgment interest on liquidated damages owed by State); 
State v. Sims, 1 Wn.App.2d 472, 476, 406 P.3d 649 (2017) (affirming interest on 
monetary sanctions imposed against the Washington Department of Social and Health 
Services [“DSHS”]). 
27 The State surely knows this accrued interest number since it has previously assured 
this Court that its Treasurer’s Office was keeping account of the accruing amount owed. 
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June 30, 2018.  But this Court does not need to continue this appellate 
review to rule right now that this liquidated $18,209,687.67 amount is 
(and will be every day after June 30, 2018 still be) due and owing under 
this Court’s August 13, 2015 sanctions order.   
E. Conclusion Regarding What’s Now In The Past  
(the State’s prior funding formulas and the trial court’s 
corresponding Final Judgment) 
The Final Judgment’s legal rulings have been affirmed.  Its factual 
findings regarding the State’s prior funding formulas have been affirmed.  
The State has now enacted legislation addressing this Court’s remedial 
order requiring the State to fully fund new formulas by September 1, 2018.  
And determining the $18,209,687.67 sanctions amount left unfunded does 
not require a continuation of this appellate proceeding.   
Plaintiffs accordingly recognize that this Court’s appellate review 
of the trial court’s 2010 Final Judgment on the State’s prior funding 
formulas can at this point finally end – thereby allowing the State’s new 
basic education program formulas to operate this upcoming school year 
without any post-budget filings in this McCleary case next year.  In short:  
allow the State’s new program to operate, with school district experience 
being the judge of whether the State’s new funding levels prove adequate 
 - 13 - 
53013253.11 
to comply with Article IX, section 1’s ample funding mandate for the 
education of all Washington children.28 
 
III. ADDRESSING THE FUTURE:     
                   THE STATE’S NEW FUNDING FORMULAS 
A. Context Motivating The Factual Finding Now Requested By 
The State 
This year, the State submitted its seventh post-budget filing in this 
McCleary proceeding.  After all those annual reports, plaintiffs can 
understand how elected officials have grown weary with what some call 
“McCleary fatigue”. 
These past few years, the State has worked hard to increase State 
school funding by billions of dollars in response to this Court’s 
January 2012 McCleary decision.29  After all that work, plaintiffs can 
understand that elected officials don’t want to hear any more complaints 
                                                 
28 Cf. November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to 
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves 
adequate.”). 
29 The State notes it has added billions of dollars to State school funding from the 
2011-2012 fiscal year to the 2018-2019 fiscal year.  E.g., State’s 2018 Brief at 16 (noting 
the State added billions of dollars between the 2011-2012 fiscal year and the 2018-2019 
fiscal year); similarly Legislature’s 2018 Report at 6-10 & 25, see also at 18-22 (various 
categorical increases).  Plaintiffs do not digress into addressing the State’s self-serving 
characterizations of its increases [e.g., Legislature’s 2018 Report at 3 (“substantial 
increases”) and at 4 (“unprecedented increases”)] because the misleading nature of 
such generalized characterizations have been previously addressed in prior post-budget 
filings.  E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 10-15 & 17-18. 
 - 14 - 
53013253.11 
about the State violating the paramount duty, ample funding, and 
all children requirements of Article IX, section 1. 
Plaintiffs can therefore understand why the State would like this 
Court to now block complaints about the State’s new funding levels.  
Hence the State’s request to gag and bury such complaints by issuing a 
preemptive factual finding that the State’s new funding levels have been 
proven to in fact comply with the paramount duty, ample funding, and 
all children requirements of Article IX, section 1.30   
The following pages explain why plaintiffs object.  
B. No Trial Has Proven The Factual Finding The State Now 
Requests 
There has been no trial on the question of whether the State’s new 
funding levels for its revised basic education program comply with the 
paramount duty, ample funding, and all children requirements of 
Article IX, section 1.   
The State accordingly cited no witness examination or cross under 
oath on that compliance question.  It cited no court-admitted exhibits on 
that question.  It cited no evidence in the appellate record proving the fact 
it wants this Court to now declare – i.e., that the State’s new funding levels 
comply with Article IX, section 1.   
                                                 
30 Supra, footnote 3. 
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In short:  the State’s demand that this Court issue a factual finding 
declaring that the State’s new funding levels comply with Article IX, 
section 1 lacks evidentiary proof.  Plaintiffs accordingly object. 
C. The State’s Now Attempting To Shut The Courthouse Door 
That It Previously Proclaimed Would Always Be Open 
Plaintiffs’ prior post-budget filings pointed out various ways in 
which the State’s new funding formulas fell short.  The State objected that 
this Court cannot rule on the State’s new funding and formulas because 
this suit’s appellate record does not address them – and insisted “the 
courthouse door will be open to plaintiffs” who want to claim in another 
suit that the State’s new funding does not comply with Article IX, 
section 1.31  
Plaintiffs object to the State’s new demand that this Court now 
issue a factual finding declaring that the State’s new funding levels 
comply with Article IX, section 1 because, frankly, the State will then cite 
that declaration to shut the courthouse door that the State previously 
insisted would always be open to plaintiffs who claim those new funding 
levels do not comply. 
                                                 
31 State’s 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 33.  
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D. This Court’s November 2017 Order Did Not Make The Factual 
Finding That The State’s 2018 Post-Budget Filing Requests 
The State asks this Court to declare that its November 2017 Order 
made a factual finding that the dollar funding levels provided by the 
State’s new formulas do in fact achieve full compliance with Article IX, 
section 1’s ample funding mandate.32   
But this Court’s November 2017 Order did not make that factual 
finding.  Instead, as the State’s 2018 court filing acknowledges, this Court 
simply deferred at this point to the legislative branch’s assurances, and 
thus deemed at this point that the State’s new program funding formulas 
satisfied a “reasonably likely to achieve standard” since they fell within 
the legislature’s range of discretion.33   
                                                 
32 Supra, footnote 3.   
33 Legislature’s 2018 Report at 2 (this Court’s November 2017 Order was based on its 
“deeming that the education policies and funding levels in that legislation [EHB 2242] 
fell within the range of discretion granted to the legislature under Article IX’s paramount 
duty”) (citing November 2017 Order at 37).  The State’s claim that its supplemental 
budget “completed the final legislative step identified by this Court as necessary to 
achieve full compliance with Article IX” (Legislature’s 2018 Report at 24) accordingly 
misses the point of this Court’s November 2017 Order – for it did not make the factual 
finding of full compliance the State now requests.  To the contrary, the November 2017 
Order expressly declared that school districts’ upcoming experience with the State’s new 
funding formulas – not this McCleary proceeding – would be the judge of whether the 
new formulas in fact provide the ample funding for all children mandated by Article IX, 
section 1.  November 2017 Order at 37 (“The legislature’s actions as to these 
components are not perfect, but the legislature has acted within the broad range of its 
policy discretion in a manner that ‘achieves or is reasonably likely to achieve’ the 
constitutional end of amply funding K-12 basic education. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 519. 
At this point, the court is willing to allow the State’s program to operate and let 
experience be the judge of whether it proves adequate.”).   [Plaintiffs also note that the 
State’s suggestion that this Court has ruled on “Article IX” in general rather than just 
the ample funding mandate of section 1 is erroneous – for as prior briefing (and the 
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That’s not a remarkable conclusion since there is no evidence in 
the trial court record about the new formulas adopted after trial.  But that 
conclusion is not a factual finding by this Court that the new funding 
formulas adopted after trial do in fact provide the ample funding levels 
Article IX, section 1 requires. 
E. The Factual Finding Requested By The State Contradicts This 
Court’s November 2017 Order 
The State has repeatedly alleged in this appellate proceeding that 
its new formulas will amply fund the education of all Washington 
children, and plaintiffs have repeatedly replied how the new formulas fall 
short. 
This Court’s November 2017 Order did not issue a final 
determination on this factual dispute – an unremarkable result since the 
trial court record in front of this Court did not address the State’s new 
formulas.  This Court’s November 2017 Order accordingly declared 
instead that, at this point, the Court is going to let actual school district 
experience be the judge of whether or not the State’s new basic education 
program funding proves to be constitutionally adequate:  “At this point, 
                                                 
 
State’s own statements to this Court) confirm, this has never been a section 2 uniformity 
case.  E.g., Plaintiffs’ 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 19-20 & n.68; Plaintiffs’ 
2016 Post-Budget Filing at 41 & n.85 (quoting State’s oral argument).]   
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the court is willing to allow the State’s program to operate and let 
experience be the judge of whether it proves adequate.”34   
The State now demands that this Court do the opposite:  charge 
ahead and declare that the State’s new funding levels comply with 
Article IX, section 1, without evidence of any school district’s actual 
experience under those new formulas.  Plaintiffs object because such a 
declaration contradicts the November 2017 Order’s ruling that this Court 
will let school district experience be the judge of whether or not the 
State’s new funding levels comply with Article IX, section 1. 
 
F. The Judicial Declaration That’s Consistent With This Court’s 
November 2017 Order 
The following paragraphs explain the judicial declaration that’s 
consistent with this Court’s November 2017 Order – namely, one which 
leaves no doubt that school district experience with the State’s new basic 
education program funding levels will determine if those new funding 
levels comply with Article IX, section 1. 
1. The State’s Basic Education Program 
This Court’s January 2012 ruling reiterated the following points 
about the State’s basic education program:   
                                                 
34 November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37. 
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 “Basic Education” means “the basic knowledge and skills 
needed to compete in today’s economy and meaningfully 
participate in this state’s democracy”35  –  more specifically: 
the knowledge and skills specified in the Seattle School 
District ruling (90 Wn.2d at 517-518), the four numbered 
provisions of ESHB 1209 (now RCW 28A.150.210), and the 
State’s corresponding Essential Academic Learning 
Requirements (EALRs).36  
 
 “Basic Education Program” means the program enacted by 
the State’s legislative authority to provide every child a 
realistic and effective opportunity to become equipped with the 
knowledge and skills specified in the above “basic education” 
definition.37   
                                                 
35 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 524 n.21 (“For our purposes, the terms ‘education’ under 
article IX, section 1 and ‘basic education’ are synonymous”), at 483 (“The word 
‘education’ under article IX, section 1 means the basic knowledge and skills needed to 
compete in today’s economy and meaningfully participate in this state’s democracy”) & 
at 521.  
36 Supra, footnote 35; McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 523-524 (the legislature provided 
specific substantive content to the word education by adopting the four numbered 
provisions in ESHB 1209 and developing the EALRs; “Building on the educational 
concepts outlined in Seattle School District, ESHB 1209 and the EALRs identified the 
knowledge and skills specifically tailored to help students succeed as active citizens in 
contemporary society. In short, these measures together define a ‘basic education’ – the 
substance of the constitutionally required ‘education’ under article IX, section 1.”).  This 
Court’s 2012 ruling was not a surprise because it reiterated prior legal rulings in the 
2010 McCleary Final Judgment and 1978 Seattle School District decision. 
37 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 525 (quoting testimony of the Chair of the Joint 
Task Force on Basic Education Finance (the foundation for ESHB 2261) that the State 
must provide an opportunity that is realistic); McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2910, 
¶174 (quoting Seattle School District holding that “The effective teaching ... of these 
essential skills make up the minimum of the education that is constitutionally required”); 
McCleary Final Judgment at CP 2929, ¶231(a) (“When this ruling holds the State is not 
making ample provision for the equipping of all children with the knowledge, skills, or 
substantive ‘education’ discussed in this ruling, that holding also includes the court’s 
determination that the State’s provisions for education do not provide all children 
residing in our State with a realistic or effective opportunity to become equipped with 
that knowledge, skill, or substantive ‘education’ ”).   
 - 20 - 
53013253.11 
 The ten components of the State’s basic education program 
include:   
(1) To/from pupil transportation.38   
(2) Materials, Supplies, and Operating Costs  
(“MSOCs”, formerly referred to as “NERCs”).39   
(3) Full-Day Kindergarten.40   
(4) K-3 class sizes of 17 students per classroom.41   
(5) Special education for children with disabilities.42   
(6) Remediation for struggling students (Learning Assistance 
Program or “LAP”).43   
(7) Transitional Bilingual Education for students whose 
primary language is other than English (Transitional 
Bilingual Instructional Program or “TBIP”, formerly 
referred to as English Language Learners or 
“ELL”).44   
(8) Highly capable student instruction.45   
(9) 24 credit hour high school graduation requirement 
(Core 24).46   
(10) Compensation sufficient to attract, recruit, and retain 
competent teachers, administrators, and staff to 
implement the State’s basic education program.47   
                                                 
38 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 496, 505-506, 526; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget 
Filing at 3. 
39 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 497-499, 506, 509 n.17, 510, 533-535; cf. State’s 
2017 Post-Budget Filing at 5. 
40 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 505-506, 510, 526 n.22; cf. State’s 
2017 Post-Budget Filing at 4. 
41 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 510, 545; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget Filing at 5.   
42 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 496, 505-506, 526; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget 
Filing at 4. 
43 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 496, 505-506, 526; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget 
Filing at 4. 
44 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 496, 505-506, 526; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget 
Filing at 4. 
45 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 505-506, 526 n.22; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget 
Filing at 3. 
46 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 505-506; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget Filing 
at 3-4.   
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2. The Current Factual Dispute About Ample Funding 
As noted earlier, the State has now replaced the prior funding 
formulas found to be unconstitutionally low at trial with new funding 
formulas that increase State funding levels.   
There is a factual dispute about the ampleness of the funding levels 
provided by these new formulas.  The State alleges its new formulas will 
amply fund the education of all Washington children.  Plaintiffs have 
repeatedly replied how the new formulas fall short.  But there is no trial 
court evidence to prove who, as a matter of fact, is correct about the 
State’s new funding formulas.  
3. Appellate Courts Are Not Trial Courts 
Plaintiffs recognize that a Supreme Court is not a trial court.  It 
does not conduct trials.  It does not observe witness examination and 
cross.  It does not handle the admission of trial exhibits.  It instead reviews 
the cold written trial court record of the proceedings below.  And here, the 
trial court record below does not address the State’s new program funding.   
The State accordingly did not (because it could not) cite evidence 
or proof in the trial court record for the factual finding the State now asks 
                                                 
 
47 See, e.g., McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 497, 507, 536; cf. State’s 2017 Post-Budget Filing 
at 4; Legislature’s 2017 Report at 19 (EHB 2242 acknowledges that funding sufficient to 
hire and retain qualified staff is an element of the State’s basic education program); 
accord, e.g., State’s 2018 Brief at 7 (“salary allocations necessary to hire and retain 
qualified staff” are a component of the State’s basic education program). 
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this appellate court to make – i.e., a factual finding that declares the 
State’s new basic education program funding levels do in fact comply with 
the previously noted ample funding for all children mandate of Article IX, 
section 1.   
This lack of evidence or proof in the record before this Court is 
also why this Court’s November 2017 Order declared that actual school 
district experience under the State’s new funding formulas (rather than this 
McCleary Court) will be the judge of whether or not the State’s new 
program funding proves to be constitutionally adequate.48   
4. Appellate Courts Set The Law For The Future 
Given the history noted above, the judicial declaration consistent 
with this Court’s November 2017 Order is one that makes it clear that this 
Court has not issued a factual finding on whether the State’s new basic 
education program funding levels do or do not in fact comply with 
Article IX, section 1.  The judicial declaration consistent with this Court’s 
November 2017 Order is one that reaffirms this Court’s November 2017 
conclusion that school district experience (rather than this McCleary case) 
will be the judge of whether or not the State’s new funding formulas will 
prove to be constitutionally adequate to comply with Article IX, section 1. 
                                                 
48 November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to 
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves 
adequate.”). 
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G. Conclusion Regarding What Now Lies Ahead  
(the State’s new funding formulas and whether they in fact provide 
the ample funding required by Article IX, section 1) 
The State has argued that its new program funding levels are 
intended to provide its 295 public school districts the ample funding 
mandated by Article IX, section 1, and alleged that its new program 
funding levels are reasonably likely to do so.  Plaintiffs have countered 
with examples illustrating how the State’s new program funding levels 
do not do that.   
But this suit’s appellate record has no trial evidence to prove who 
is in fact correct. The State’s demand that this Court nonetheless declare 
that the State’s new program funding levels do in fact comply with 
Article IX, section 1 is therefore a demand for judicial speculation.   
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that speculating is not a proper role 
for this Court.  Especially here, where the factual finding demanded by the 
State preemptively shuts the courthouse door to a future plaintiff seeking 
to prove the State’s new program funding levels violate Article IX, 
section 1.  Especially here, where the State itself has previously assured 
this Court that the courthouse door would always be open for such a 
plaintiff.  And especially here, where this Court’s November 2017 Order 
told our public school students that their schools’ upcoming experience 
(rather than this McCleary appeal proceeding) will be the judge of whether 
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the State’s new funding formulas do in fact amply fund the State’s basic 
education program for those students in full compliance with Article IX, 
section 1.49 
This Court has reiterated in this case that its “constitutional 
responsibility is to the schoolchildren of this state who have an 
enforceable right under article IX, section 1 to an amply funded 
education.”50  And it has emphasized that fulfilling the State’s 
constitutional responsibility under Article IX, section 1 requires the 
judicial branch to remain vigilant, because success in upholding 
Washington children’s positive constitutional right to an amply funded 
education depends on continued vigilance on the part of the courts.51   
The State’s demand for a preemptive factual finding of full 
constitutional compliance, in contrast, asks the judicial branch to close the 
courthouse door, turn off the lights, and go to sleep. 
Plaintiffs accordingly oppose the State’s demand for a preemptive 
constitutional compliance declaration.  The trial court record on appeal, 
the State’s own “courthouse door will be open” assurance to this Court, 
and the recent November 2017 Order, all confirm a fundamental point:  
                                                 
49 November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to 
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the judge of whether it proves 
adequate.”). 
50 November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 2. 
51 McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 547.   
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the question of whether the State’s new funding levels do in fact comply 
with the ample funding for all children mandate of Article IX, section 1 is 
a question to be resolved another day in another case – not a question to be 
gagged and buried here with a speculative factual finding of compliance 
today. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs agree the State’s appeal of the trial court’s February 2010 
Final Judgment could be terminated, because (1) this Court affirmed the 
trial court’s legal ruling on the meaning of Article IX, section 1; (2) it 
affirmed the trial court’s factual finding that the State’s prior funding 
formulas violated Article IX, section 1; (3) the State has addressed this 
Court’s remedial order by providing for the funding of the State’s new 
formulas by September 1, 2018; and (4) calculating the interest amount 
that accrued on the liquidated $100,000/day penalty requires math rather 
than further Supreme Court proceedings. 
Plaintiffs do not agree, however, that this Court should immunize 
the State’s new funding formulas from Article IX, section 1 scrutiny by 
issuing a preemptive factual finding that the State’s new program funding 
levels do in fact comply with the ample funding for all children mandate 
of Article IX, section 1.   
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A factual finding about the State’s new program funding levels 
requires proven facts about those new funding levels.  But there are no 
such facts in the appellate record of this suit’s 2009 trial.  Plaintiffs 
accordingly acknowledge the logic of this Court’s November 2017 Order 
holding that the State’s new program should at this point be allowed to 
operate, with actual experience being the judge of whether its new funding 
levels prove constitutionally adequate.52 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 2018.  
Foster Pepper PLLC 
        s/ Thomas F. Ahearne                    . 
Thomas F. Ahearne, WSBA No. 14844 
Christopher G. Emch, WSBA No. 26457 
Adrian Urquhart Winder, WSBA No. 38071 
Kelly A. Mennemeier, WSBA No. 51838 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents McCleary 
Family, Venema Family, and Network for 
Excellence in Washington Schools (NEWS) 
                                                 
52 November 15, 2017 McCleary Order at 37 (“At this point, the court is willing to 
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